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Key messages 
• Central banks and financial supervisors are playing a crucial role in shaping the 
responses to the crisis brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic in both the 
immediate stabilisation phase and the subsequent recovery phase. Many of the 
same central banks are also taking action to incorporate climate risks and green 
finance across their operations. 
• So far, however, there is limited evidence that central banks’ and supervisory 
authorities’ responses to COVID-19 have actively taken account of climate change 
or wider sustainability goals. 
• To avoid lock-in to a high-carbon recovery and to fulfil their mandates for financial 
stability, central banks and supervisors need to align their COVID-19 response 
measures with the Paris Agreement on climate change. This toolbox provides a 
framework for doing this. 
• A strong rationale exists for this:  
1. To ensure that climate risks are accurately reflected in central banks’ balance 
sheets and operations 
2. To minimise climate-related risks for regulated financial institutions 
3. To minimise climate-related risks at the level of the financial system 
4. To support governments’ efforts to scale up sustainable finance in line with 
the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals.  
• Numerous instruments that are already being applied by central banks and financial 
supervisors in the crisis can be calibrated in ways that account for climate- and 
other sustainability-related financial risks and/or contribute to the achievement of 
climate and sustainability goals. This initial toolbox sets out three broad categories of 
measures – monetary, prudential and other – covering nine types of tools. It provides 
central banks and financial supervisors with options to align their crisis response 
measures. 
• The briefing also reviews the responses to the COVID-19 crisis taken to date by 
monetary and financial authorities in jurisdictions that are members of the Network 
for Greening the Financial System, a central bank alliance.  
• Looking ahead, monetary and financial authorities can take steps now that would 
contribute to sustainable crisis responses and prevent a further build-up of climate 
risks in financial institutions’ balance sheets, namely:  
1. Amend collateral frameworks to better account for climate change-related 
and other environmental risks  
2. Align asset purchases and refinancing operations with Paris Agreement goals  
3. Adjust prudential measures to avoid a manifestation of transition risks on the 
balance sheets of financial institutions  
4. Adopt sustainable and responsible investment principles for portfolio 
management, including policy portfolios. 
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Introduction: Aligning recovery measures with 
sustainable finance 
Central banks and financial supervisors have taken measures extraordinary in both nature 
and scale to respond to the financial and economic crisis brought about by the COVID-19 
pandemic. They have played a crucial role in the immediate stabilisation phase and this 
will continue in the subsequent recovery phase. The policies adopted during the crisis will in 
many cases have profound implications for long-term outcomes. In particular, crisis 
response measures, while geared towards short-term pressures, also need to be consistent 
with long-term climate and sustainability goals and contribute to a just transition to a 
sustainable economy. As highlighted by Frank Elderson, the Chair of the Central Banks and 
Financial Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), “It is vital that we 
do not lose the momentum that we had before the pandemic [and] keep the long-term 
perspective and manage climate-related risk” (Elderson, 2020a), and that “we need to do 
everything to support a green recovery” (Elderson, 2020b). 
Aim of the paper 
This briefing is designed to provide central banks and financial supervisors with an initial 
toolbox of options to align their crisis response measures with climate and sustainability 
objectives and mitigate potential sustainability risks. It has been produced by the 
International Network of Sustainable Financial Policy Insights, Research and Exchange 
(INSPIRE), a research stakeholder of the NGFS. The paper is written as a ‘rapid response’ 
and therefore provides only a snapshot of policy tools, but it can serve as a guide to further 
work to support central banks and supervisors as they seek to apply these measures. 
Why should central banks and supervisors be concerned with climate change and 
the environment at this time? 
The rationale for central banks and supervisors to incorporate climate and sustainability 
factors into the COVID-19 crisis response measures is four-fold:  
1. To ensure that climate risks are accurately reflected in central banks’ balance sheets 
and operations.1 
2. To minimise climate-related risks for regulated financial institutions.  
3. To minimise climate-related risks at the level of the financial system.  
4. To support governments’ efforts to scale up sustainable finance in line with the Paris 
Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals.  
This way, central banks and supervisors would operate consistently with other governmental 
policies and avoid the long-term risks associated with climate change and environmental 
degradation. 
  
                                                            
1  Strictly speaking, most central banks are not existentially threatened at present by their exposure to climate risks, given their ability to expand 
the money supply if these risks should manifest in their balance sheets (in contrast to private financial institutions). There is, however, an 
important signalling effect to central bank actions. 
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What does the toolbox include? 
Numerous instruments being applied by central banks and financial supervisors in the crisis 
can be calibrated in ways that account for climate- and other sustainability-related 
financial risks and/or contribute to the achievement of climate and sustainability goals. The 
toolbox is set out in Table 1 (p9): it presents the policy tools available to central banks and 
financial supervisors, distinguishing between conventional (often sustainability-blind) 
measures and those that are sustainability-enhanced, in other words they take climate and 
wider sustainable development factors into account.  
Tools and areas 
The table identifies nine different types of tools, grouped in three broad areas: monetary 
policy, financial stability, and ‘other’. The table comprises both instruments that have 
already been used by central banks or supervisors in a sustainability-enhancing calibration, 
and instruments that have thus far not been utilised to address sustainability risks or 
objectives.  
The current situation, in which central banks are implementing large-scale stimulus 
measures, not only presents an opportunity for supporting a sustainable recovery through 
targeted policy instruments: it also necessitates that the implementation of prudential 
instruments that account for sustainability risks – and climate risks in particular – is not 
delayed, and is even strengthened to mitigate the potential build-up of additional risks in 
portfolios. Liquidity-enhancing stimulus measures that are not aligned with sustainability 
objectives can contribute significantly to the build-up of sustainability-related risks in 
portfolios of financial institutions and overall in the financial system by locking in investment 
pathways. The easing of countercyclical and other prudential instruments without a 
sustainability-risk-sensitive calibration can further increase these risks. This issue is particularly 
pressing as many central banks and supervisory authorities are currently relaxing micro- and 
macroprudential standards to encourage lending by financial institutions. Finally, the 
profound social consequences of the COVID-19 crisis have highlighted the need for central 
banks and supervisors to consider the role they could play in delivering a just transition, 
alongside governments and other actors in the financial system (Thallinger and Robins, 
2020). 
The toolbox therefore includes both monetary and financial stability-related instruments, 
since these are each currently employed by central banks and supervisors for 
countercyclical policy responses. Monetary expansion that is calibrated by central banks to 
achieve an inflation target (in expectation of a certain time horizon), but does not take 
sustainability objectives into consideration in its operational implementation (e.g. in open 
market operations, standing facilities and reserve requirements) creates an even stronger 
urgency for supervisors to address the potential build-up of climate-related risks in the 
calibration and current easing of prudential instruments. While instruments such as interest 
rates, asset purchase programmes and collateral framework changes are usually seen as 
the main crisis response tools, the countercyclical calibration of prudential instruments, 
including capital buffers, liquidity coverage ratios (LCR) or loan-to-value ratios (LVR), is also 
actively used and can therefore be discussed as a crisis response measure that needs to 
be aligned with sustainable objectives in the current context, and for which general 
progress should not be delayed (e.g. tools 5, 6, 8 and 9 in Table 1).  
In order to illustrate the toolbox and technical implementation details, we include 
references to a selection of the relevant literature. 
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Informed by global experience 
The toolbox draws on global experience, reflecting differing financial cultures and 
objectives of central banks and supervisors around the world. Instruments that are seen as 
standard by some central banks may not be conventionally used elsewhere (e.g. directed 
lending in India, targeted refinancing in Bangladesh and window guidance in China)2. 
Central banks and supervisors across different jurisdictions operate within different 
mandates and legal frameworks (Dikau and Volz, 2020a). They also face diverse challenges 
in their economies and financial systems. This has strong implications for the selection of 
instruments that can be employed and for the degree to which a country-specific 
selection of them could be calibrated in a sustainability-enhanced way. It needs to be 
emphasised, therefore, that there should be no one-size-fits-all recommendation for crisis 
response measures that support a transition towards greener growth and a sustainable 
economy. 
At the same time, acknowledging that different institutions have different mandates should 
not be taken as a reason for inaction. The response of central banks and supervisors to 
COVID-19 has demonstrated the vast array of policy measures and instruments potentially 
at their disposal, and renders ongoing debates redundant regarding the availability of a 
number of ‘unconventional’ measures. The threat of financial crisis brought on by COVID-19 
provides a uniquely clear picture of what measures each institution is capable of. Now, 
these measures should take climate and sustainability into account. 
The emerging evidence base: limited responses so far aligned with Paris or the SDGs 
Table 2 provides an overview of the responses to the COVID-19 crisis taken to date by 
monetary and financial authorities in jurisdictions with NGFS member institutions. So far, 
there is limited evidence that central banks’ and supervisory authorities’ responses have 
been aligned with the Paris Agreement or wider Sustainable Development Goals.  
One emerging finding from this empirical exercise is that many central banks have, apart 
from lowering interest rates, moved quickly to extend their collateral frameworks to include 
a broader variety and quality of assets, implemented new or scaled up existing 
quantitative easing programmes and introduced various targeted and non-targeted 
additional (re)financing and purchase facilities. Given that most of these instruments do not 
take environmental, social or climate-related risks into account, these efforts might not only 
slow the pace at which a just and sustainable transition can be achieved, it may also lead 
to a significant additional build-up of climate risk on the balance sheets of financial 
institutions, the financial system, and the economy as a whole. This risk could be 
exacerbated by our finding that most central banks and supervisors have eased 
countercyclical capital buffers and general (microprudential) regulation and supervisory 
standards. We recognise that the situation is highly dynamic, and many newly announced 
programmes will take time to fully design and implement: this provides considerable scope 
for central banks and supervisors to ‘retrofit’ sustainability factors into their crisis response 
measures. 
Some continued advancement of the sustainability agenda: examples 
While we have not been able to identify any monetary or prudential policy crisis responses 
that have been calibrated in sustainability-enhanced ways, there are some positive 
examples of monetary and financial authorities advancing the sustainability agenda 
despite the challenges of COVID-19. For example: 
                                                            
2  While in the absence of well-developed financial markets some central banks in emerging and developing economies may have to rely on 
these direct instruments for the implementation of monetary policy, these tools may be inappropriate or even harmful if implemented by 
central banks operating in highly advanced financial markets. 
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• In March 2020 the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas – the central bank of the Philippines 
(which has not yet joined the NGFS) – approved a Sustainable Finance Framework 
(BSP, 2020).  
• In May the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures 
Commission jointly launched a Green and Sustainable Finance Cross-Agency 
Steering Group to “co-ordinate the management of climate and environmental risks 
to the financial sector, accelerate the growth of green and sustainable finance in 
Hong Kong and support the Government’s climate strategies” (HKMA, 2020).  
• In May the European Central Bank (ECB) launched a public consultation on 
guidelines for addressing climate-related and environmental risks (ECB, 2020).  
• In May the French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority published a report 
on good practice in governance and management of climate-related risks by 
French banking institutions (ACPR, 2020).  
• The Mexican Central Bank created a Sustainable Finance Committee together with 
the Ministry of Finance, also in May.  
• Last but not least, the NGFS published a Guide for Supervisors Integrating Climate-
related and Environmental Risks into Prudential Supervision (NGFS, 2020).  
These steps and initiatives are not directly related to the COVID-19 crisis but are outcomes 
of longer processes and as such may not be characterised as crisis response measures. 
However, they send an important signal to financial markets at this point in time, namely 
that monetary and financial authorities will not relent in their efforts to climate-proof 
financial systems, despite the current crisis. 
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Initial conclusions and ways forward 
This toolbox provides an initial framework for categorising the range of measures that 
central banks and financial supervisors can take to support a sustainable recovery and 
ensure that their crisis response measures do not have unintended consequences in terms 
of climate risk. It will be important to go into greater technical detail about the application 
of instruments in the particular circumstances facing individual countries during the crisis. 
Considerable scope also exists for collaboration between central banks, supervisors and 
researchers to explore priority actions across a range of countries and jurisdictions. 
Supporting this type of collaboration is a core goal of INSPIRE (INSPIRE, 2020). INSPIRE will 
provide further analysis and updates on the toolbox as practice evolves. 
Without putting an undue burden on financial firms during times of crisis, monetary and 
financial authorities can take steps now that would contribute to sustainable crisis 
responses and prevent a further build-up of climate risks in financial institutions’ balance 
sheets.  
Four priorities include: 
• Collateral frameworks: First, the underlying risk assessment for collateral frameworks 
could be adjusted to better account for climate change-related and other 
environmental risks, leading to a change of haircuts and collateral valuation, as 
well as of the eligible collateral pool. In a second step, assets from firms heavily 
exposed to climate-related transition risk could be excluded, which would have 
positive implications for the Paris-alignment of asset purchase programmes, 
refinancing operations and other central bank operations. Because the exclusion 
of these high risk assets would reduce the total amount of pledgeable collateral, 
thereby adversely affecting the access of financial institutions to liquidity, it is 
essential to replace them in the collateral framework with environmentally-friendly 
assets. Furthermore, central banks could require commercial banks to pledge a 
pool of collateral aligned with sustainability objectives, while leaving banks free to 
choose the composition of this pool. 
• Asset purchases, refinancing operations and crisis facilities: Central banks could 
better align their asset purchases with Paris Agreement goals. For example, they 
could decrease the share of assets exposed to climate-related transition risks in 
their corporate debt purchases. This option would align their asset purchases on 
environmental objectives, but also reduce their own exposure to climate risks. 
Moreover, central banks’ refinancing operations and crisis facilities could be 
conditioned on borrowers’ alignment with sustainability goals. 
• Prudential measures: In response to the current expansionary liquidity provision 
measures and the easing of countercyclical regulatory and supervisory instruments, 
it is necessary to adjust prudential measures to avoid a manifestation of transition 
risks on the balance sheets of financial institutions. Announcing environmental 
disclosure requirements and stress testing for 2021 is a first step that would not cause 
any immediate regulatory burdens on financial institutions, but would signal the 
necessity to account for potential exposure to climate risks added through lending 
and investment decisions in the current crisis phase. Supervisors should also 
announce their intention to calibrate risk weights for climate-risks exposures and 
work towards an adoption of such an approach globally through the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. Furthermore, where prudential instruments such 
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as capital requirements are eased, such measures could exclude assets from firms 
most exposed to climate risks, and transition risks in particular.3 
• Management of central bank portfolios: Last but not least, and as outlined by the 
NGFS (2019), central banks should adopt sustainable and responsible investment 
principles for portfolio management, including policy portfolios, such as the 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), and commit to following the 
recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 
(TCFD). They should also integrate climate risk metrics in portfolio risk managements, 
to better control for the exposure of their assets to such risks. 
The COVID-19 crisis should not deter the resolve of central banks and supervisors to 
integrate sustainability and climate risks into financial decision-making. Rather, the 
pandemic crisis illustrates the need to strengthen the resilience of our economies and 
societies, and this requires financial markets to better mitigate climate and other 
sustainability risks. The current crisis, which has prompted radical changes of long-
established policy practices, also offers a window to include and address climate risks in 
these new-found approaches. Central banks and supervisors must ensure that they do 
whatever they can, within their mandate, to align their own COVID-19 crisis responses and 
decision-making in the financial sector with long-term sustainability goals to help the world 
economy to achieve a just transition to sustainability. 
  
                                                            
3  The details of this approach would have to be further explored, and details and questions with regard to whether central banks were to 
exclude assets from firms that were not particularly exposed to climate risks (e.g. because they are well diversified) even though they also 
owned substantial carbon-intensive assets have to be clarified. 
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Table 1: Policy tools available to central banks 
and financial supervisors 
 Conventional (sustainability-blind) 
calibration 
Sustainability-enhanced calibration 
1. Monetary policy 
(1) Collateral 
frameworks 
• Collateral credit quality is assessed 
based on conventional methods, 
perpetuating exposure to and market 
mispricing of climate risks and carbon 
bias and maintaining financing 
conditions for industries not aligned with 
the Paris Agreement. 
• Collateral frameworks become carbon-
neutral, take climate- and other 
sustainability-related financial risks into 
account and apply haircuts4 to 
account for these risks. 
• Collateral frameworks exclude asset 
classes that are not aligned with 
sustainability goals such as the Paris 
Agreement.5 
(2) Implementing 
monetary policy: 
indirect instruments 
(open market 
operations, standing 
facilities, reserve 
requirements) 
• Standard instruments such as 
refinancing operations and 
programmes are calibrated without 
sustainability considerations, leading to 
a potential carbon bias. 
• Align refinancing operations with 
sustainability goals such as the Paris 
Agreement.6 
• Differentiated reserve requirements, risk 
weights, accounting for carbon 
footprint, climate-related financial risk 
(particularly transition risks),7 or other 
sustainability factors. 
• Interest rates based on sustainability 
criteria. 
(3) Non-standard 
instruments 
• Asset purchase programmes (APPs) 
ignore climate- and other sustainability-
related financial risks, perpetuating 
financial markets’ exposure to climate 
risks and carbon bias.8 
• Direct (short-term) credit to the 
government to support standard fiscal 
spending. 
• Helicopter money without 
conditionality. 
• APPs exclude carbon-intensive assets.9  
• Direct (short-term) credit to the 
government to support sustainable/ 
Paris-aligned fiscal policies.10 
• Purchase of green sovereign bonds 
• Helicopter money conditioned on 
sustainable/Paris-aligned spending. 
  
                                                            
4  Further research is needed to provide a framework for the calculation and application of these haircuts, building on the application of an 
appropriate risk assessment methodology. 
5  Monnin (2020) stresses the shortcomings of the risk metrics to sufficiently reflect climate financial risks used by central banks to assess whether 
securities are eligible as collateral. He proposes to (i) supplement the external risk assessments with existing climate risk analytics; (ii) integrate 
climate risk analysis in their in-house risk assessments; (iii) to only accept assessments provided by rating agencies that adequately account 
for climate financial risks; and (iv) accept counterparties’ risk assessments conditional on these counterparties’ climate financial risk 
assessments. For more on the greening of collateral frameworks in the context of the Eurosystem Collateral Framework, see Schoenmaker 
(2019). 
6  Building on collateral framework adjustments, this could be operationalised through the exclusion of highly polluting and carbon-intensive 
assets eligible under different refinancing programmes. Alternatively, additional haircuts or differentiated interest rates could be used to 
account for higher climate-related risks and to disincentivise non-Paris alignment. In the European context, this could include the greening of 
the targeted longer-term refinancing operations. 
7  The incorporation of physical risks could also have adverse side effects for countries vulnerable to climate change (Buhr et al. 2018). 
8  See Matikainen et al. (2017). 
9  In order to maintain the same total value of purchases and to replace excluded assets, it could be necessary to ease some of the standard 
assessment criteria of eligible assets. 
10  The Fed’s municipal bond purchases under its Municipal Liquidity Facility are of particular interest in this context as they could potentially 
offer a set of decarbonisation opportunities given the limited fiscal capacity of cities/states. 
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(4) Direct credit 
allocation 
instruments11 
• Direct controls on interest rates (e.g. 
minimum and maximum interest rates, 
preferential rates for certain loan 
categories). 
• Credit ceilings (at aggregate level or 
on individual banks). 
• Directed lending policies (e.g. 
preferential central bank refinance 
facilities to direct credit to priority 
sectors). 
• Window guidance/moral suasion to 
promote priority sectors. 
• Credit interest rate ceilings for 
sustainable priority sectors, asset 
classes, and firms. 
• Minimum/maximum allocation of credit 
through credit ceilings or quotas to 
restrict/promote lending to carbon-
intensive/sustainable sectors. 
• Targeted refinancing lines to promote 
credit for sustainable sectors. 
• Window guidance/moral suasion to 
promote lending to sustainable 
sectors.12 
2. Financial stability: Regulation and supervision 
(5) Microprudential 
instruments 
• Conventional stress testing / excessive 
delay of climate-stress testing. 
• No disclosure requirements for climate-
related financial risks. 
• Standard supervisory review process 
(SRP). 
• Conventional calibration of other Basel 
III instruments. 
• Stress testing frameworks that 
acknowledge climate and other 
sustainability risks and help firms take 
into account longer-term risks.13 
• Mandatory disclosure requirements for 
climate-related financial risks or other 
sustainability risks. 
• Supervisory review process (SRP) that 
highlights management of climate-
related financial risks or other 
sustainability risks. 
• Climate risk-sensitive calibration of other 
Basel III instruments, distinguishing 
between low-carbon and carbon-
intensive/high-exposure assets to create 
buffers against climate-related losses 
(e.g. differential risk-based capital 
requirements, lower required stable 
funding factor for green loans). 
(6) Macroprudential 
instruments 
• Conventional system-wide stress testing. 
• Calibration of instruments along the 
cyclical dimension without explicit 
acknowledgement of climate-related 
financial risks.  
• Calibration of instruments along the 
cross-sectional dimension without 
explicit acknowledgement of climate-
related financial risks. 
• System-wide stress testing that 
acknowledges and assesses systemic 
climate-related financial risks (see 
Battiston et al., 2017). 
• Cyclical instruments calibrated to 
account for and mitigate systemic risk 
implications of climate change and 
restrain the build-up of risk-taking during 
the recovery/expansion phase (e.g. 
countercyclical and higher capital 
buffer in order to protect the financial 
sector from periods of excessive 
carbon-intensive credit growth, LVRs 
and loan-to-income ratios to limit the 
extension of credit by banks to carbon-
intensive industries and investment in 
non-sustainable asset classes).14  
                                                            
11  Direct instruments, which are mostly relevant in the emerging market and developing economy context where underdeveloped financial 
markets permit the effective employment of indirect instruments, operate by setting or limiting either prices or quantities through regulations 
and may also be used to allocate credit. Furthermore, it is important to note that the calibration of many central banking and supervisory 
instruments can have intended or unintended consequences for the allocation of credit. 
12  Window guidance, also known as moral suasion, has been used in the past by the BOJ and the PBOC to influence the quantity and quality of 
credit. The PBOC has, until recently, used window guidance to promote sustainable finance. See Dikau and Volz (2020). 
13  Stress-testing frameworks that include both, (a) ‘conventional’ stress tests that are applied to climate tail risks over a shorter period to assess 
capital adequacy and (b) the development of stress tests to account for longer-term risks that can have other prescriptive outcomes. 
14  See Schoenmaker and van Tilburg (2016) for more details on the incorporation of climate change-related risks into macroprudential 
instruments. 
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• Cross-sectional instruments calibrated 
to account for and mitigate systemic 
risk implications of climate change and 
to mitigate individual institutions’ 
contribution to systemic risk (e.g. large 
exposure restrictions to limit financial 
institutions’ exposure to highly carbon-
intensive assets, capital surcharges for 
systemically important financial 
institutions and institutions with high 
exposure to carbon-intensive assets). 
3. Other policies 
(7) Further financing 
schemes and other 
initiatives 
• Corporate financing facilities or loan 
guarantees without climate or 
sustainability conditionality. 
• Financial sector bailouts without 
climate or sustainability conditionality. 
• Corporate financing facilities or loan 
guarantees subject to reduction of CO2 
emissions or sustainability enhancing 
activities. 
• Incorporation of sustainability 
considerations into bailout packages in 
case of partial or full nationalisation of 
financial institutions. 
• Funding sustainable lending/investment 
schemes by public banks and 
development finance institutions (e.g. 
for renewable energy or retrofitting of 
buildings) through refinancing credit 
lines or purchase of bonds under APPs 
in secondary market or direct 
refinancing operations. 
• Tailoring of supervisory frameworks for 
development banks to enhance their 
public policy capacity to bear risk, 
promote economic transformation. 
(8) Management of 
central bank 
portfolios 
• Management of central bank portfolios 
without consideration of climate 
change and other sustainability risks. 
• Disclosure of climate-related financial 
risks in own portfolios (e.g. following the 
TCFD recommendations) (see NGFS, 
2019 and Fender, 2019). 
• Adopting sustainable and responsible 
investment principles for portfolio 
management (e.g. PRI). 
(9) Supporting 
sustainable finance 
 
• Sustainable finance roadmaps/ 
guidance for financial institutions. 
• Advice and dialogue with other parts of 
the government. 
• Research and publication of 
handbooks and resources (e.g. 
reference scenarios, risk assessment 
methodologies). 
• Capacity building programmes in 
sustainable finance for the financial 
sector, convening role of central banks. 
Source: Compiled by authors drawing on Dikau and Volz (2019, 2020a), Dikau et al. (2019) and Schoenmaker 
and van Tilburg (2016). 
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Table 2: Policy tools used by central banks and 
financial supervisors during the COVID-19 
pandemic (as of 2 June 2020) 
1. Monetary policy 
(1) Collateral 
frameworks 
• Australia – Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA): Broadening the range of eligible 
collateral for open market operations to include securities issued by non-bank 
corporations with an investment grade. 
• Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo – 
Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO): Extension of the collateral framework 
to access central bank refinancing to include bank loans to prequalified 1,700 
private companies. 
• Canada – Bank of Canada (BOC): Expanding the list of eligible collateral for Term 
Repo operations to the full range of eligible collateral for the Standing Liquidity 
Facility, except the Non-Mortgage Loan Portfolio. 
• Chile – Central Bank of Chile (CBC): Inclusion of corporate securities as collateral for 
the Central Bank’s liquidity operations and inclusion of high-rated commercial loans 
as collateral for the funding facility operations. 
• Colombia – Banco de la Republica (BDR): Expansion of liquidity overnight and term 
facilities in terms of amounts, applicable securities and eligible counterparts. 
• Eurozone – European Central Bank (ECB)/European System of Central Banks (ESCB): 
Broad package of collateral easing measures for Eurosystem credit operations (e.g. 
expansion of the scope of so-called additional credit claims framework so that it 
may also include public sector-guaranteed loans to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), self-employed individuals, and households), expanded range of 
eligible assets under the corporate sector purchase programme, and relaxation of 
collateral standards for Eurosystem refinancing operations. 
• Hungary – Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB): Expansion of eligible collateral. 
• Italy – Banca d’Italia: Extension of additional credit claim frameworks to include 
loans backed by COVID-19-related public sector guarantees in order to promote 
the use of credit claims as collateral and to incentivise lending to SMEs. 
• Japan – Bank of Japan (BOJ): Expansion of the range of eligible counterparties and 
collateral to private debt (including household debt). 
• Korea – Bank of Korea (BOK): Expansion of the list of eligible open market 
operations (OMO) participants to include select non-bank financial institutions; 
expanding eligible OMO collateral to include bank bonds, certain bonds from 
public enterprises and agencies, and government-guaranteed mortgage-backed 
securities issued by Korea Housing Finance Corporation, easing collateral 
requirements for net settlements in the BOK payments system. 
• Mexico – Banco de México (Banxico): Expansion of liquidity facilities, accepting a 
broader range of collateral and expanding eligible institutions. 
• Morocco – Bank-Al-Maghrib (BAM): Expansion of the range of collateral accepted 
for repos and credit guarantees to include public and private debt instruments 
(including mortgages). 
• Sweden – Riksbank: Easing rules for the use of covered bonds as collateral. 
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(2) Implementing 
monetary policy: 
indirect instruments 
(open market 
operations, standing 
facilities, reserve 
requirements) 
• Brazil – Banco Central do Brasil (BCB): Reduction of reserve requirements and 
capital conservation buffers, temporary relaxation of provisioning rules, facility to 
provide loans to financial institutions backed by private corporate bonds as 
collateral. 
• Cambodia – National Bank of Cambodia (NBC): Lowering required reserves that 
banking and financial institutions. 
• Colombia – BDR: Lowering the reserve requirement applicable to savings and 
checking accounts. 
• Chile – CBC: Introduction of a new funding facility for banks conditional on them 
increasing credit. 
• China – PBOC: Liquidity injection of RMB 3.33 trillion (gross) into the banking system 
via open market operations (reverse repos and medium-term lending facilities).  
• Denmark – Danmarks Nationalbank (DN): Launch of an ‘extraordinary lending 
facility’ which will make full-allotment, 1-week, collateralised loans available to 
banks at -0.5 per cent interest rate. 
• Eurozone – ECB/ESCB: Temporary additional auctions of the full-allotment, fixed rate 
temporary liquidity facility at the deposit facility rate and more favourable terms on 
existing targeted longer-term refinancing operations, new liquidity facility, which 
consists of a series of non-targeted Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing 
Operations carried out with an interest rate that is 25bp below the average main 
refinancing operations rate prevailing over the life of the operation. 
• Germany – Bundesbank: Additional €100 billion to refinance expanded short-term 
liquidity provision to companies through the public development bank KfW, in 
partnership with commercial banks. 
• Hong Kong SAR – Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA): Regulatory reserves cut 
by half to increase banks’ lending capacity. 
• Hungary – MNB: Introduction of a long-term unlimited collateralised lending facility; 
suspension of penalties for unmet reserve requirements. 
• Indonesia – Bank Indonesia (BI): Lowering reserve requirement ratios for banks. 
• Malaysia – Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM): Lowering the Statutory Reserve 
Requirement Ratio by 100 basis points to 2 per cent. 
• Mexico – Banxico: Reduction of the mandatory regulatory deposit with Banxico, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Finance, seeking to strengthen market making in the 
government bond market. 
• New Zealand – Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ): Introduction of Term Auction 
Facility allowing banks access to collateralised loans of up to 12 months, and a 
corporate facility in which the RBNZ will offer up to NZ$500 million per week in open 
market operations with banks against corporate paper and asset-backed 
securities, Term Lending Facility, a longer-term funding scheme for banks at 0.25 per 
cent. 
• Norway – Norges Bank (NB): Provision of additional liquidity to banks in form of loans 
of differing maturities. 
• South Africa – South African Reserve Bank (SARB): Increasing the number of repo 
auctions to two to provide intraday liquidity support to clearing banks at the policy 
rate; reducing the upper and lower limits of the standing facility to lend at repo-rate 
and borrow at repo-rate less 200 bps; and raising the size of the main weekly 
refinancing operations as needed, programme aimed to purchase government 
securities in the secondary market across the entire yield curve and extend the 
main refinancing instrument maturities. 
• Korea – BOK: Making unlimited amounts available through open market operations, 
expansion of BOK repo operations to non-banks, creation of a BOK lending 
programme to non-banks with corporate bonds as collateral. 
• Russia – Central Bank of Russia (CBR): Introduction of long-term refinancing 
instrument (long-term repos are planned for one month and one year). 
• Switzerland – Swiss National Bank (SNB): COVID-19 refinancing facility operating in 
conjunction with the federal government’s guarantees for corporate loans, 
allowing banks to obtain liquidity from the SNB. 
• Sweden – Riksbank: Lending of up to SEK 500 billion to companies via banks; 
introduction of a new lending facility whereby banks can borrow unlimited amounts 
(given adequate collateral) with 3-month maturity. 
• United Arab Emirates – Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates (CBUAE): Halving 
of banks’ required reserve requirements from 14 to 7 per cent; zero-interest rate 
collateralised loans to banks (AED 50 billion) 
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• United Kingdom – Bank of England (BoE): activating a Contingent Term Repo 
Facility to complement the Bank’s existing sterling liquidity facilities 
• United States – Fed: Purchase of Treasury and agency securities in the amount as 
needed. Expanded overnight and term repos. Lowering cost of discount window 
lending. Reducing existing cost of swap lines with major central banks and 
extending the maturity of FX operations; broadening US dollar swap lines to more 
central banks; offering temporary repo facility for foreign and international 
monetary authorities. 
(3) Non-standard 
instruments 
• Canada – BOC: Extension of the bond buyback program across all maturities, 
supporting the Canada Mortgage Bond (CMB) market by purchasing CMBs in the 
secondary market, launching the Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase Facility, 
announcing the Provincial Money Market Purchase program, the Provincial Bond 
Purchase Program, the Commercial Paper Purchase Program, the Corporate Bond 
Purchase Program, and the purchase of Government of Canada securities in the 
secondary market. 
• Colombia – BDR: COP 10 trillion programme to purchase securities issued by credit 
institutions, treasury purchases in the secondary market. 
• Costa Rica – El Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR): Purchasing government 
securities in the secondary market to provide liquidity during market distress. 
• Chile – CBC: Programme for purchase of bank bonds (up to US$8 billion). 
• Eurozone – ECB/ESCB: Additional asset purchases of €120 billion under the APP, €750 
billion asset purchase programme of private and public sector securities (Pandemic 
Emergency Purchase Program, PEPP). 
• Finland – Bank of Finland (BOF): Support to liquidity through investing in short-term 
Finnish corporate commercial paper (€1 billion). 
• Hungary – MNB: QE programme, buying government securities on the secondary 
market, and the mortgage bond purchase programme is being re-started. 
• Indonesia – BI: Given authority to purchase government bonds in the primary 
market as a last resort, purchase of government bonds in the primary market during 
the latest Islamic bonds auction. 
• Japan – BOJ: Targeted liquidity provision through an increase in the size and 
frequency of Japanese government bond (JGB) purchases, special funds-supplying 
operation to provide loans to financial institution to facilitate financing of 
corporates, a temporary increase in the annual pace of BOJ’s purchases of 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and Japan-Real Estate Investment Trusts (J-REITs), 
and a temporary additional increase of targeted purchases of commercial paper 
and corporate bonds. 
• New Zealand – RBNZ: Near doubling of the Large-Scale Asset Purchase programme 
(LSAP) to purchase up to $60 billion of government bonds and Local Government 
Funding Agency (LGFA) bonds in the secondary market over the next 12 months, 
adding NZ$3 billion (equivalent to 30 per cent on issue) of LGFA debt to the LSAP, 
doubling the overdraft on the crown settlement account to NZ$10 billion for April to 
June to meet the government’s short-term cash needs. 
• Korea – BOK: Purchasing Korean Treasury Bonds (KRW 3.0 trillion). 
• Sweden – Riksbank: Increase of purchases of securities of up to SEK 300 billion in 
2020 (where securities may include government and municipal bonds, covered 
bonds and securities issued by non-financial corporations). 
• Thailand – Bank of Thailand (BOT): Corporate Bond Stabilization Fund to provide 
bridge financing of up to THB 400 billion to high-quality firms with bonds maturing 
during 2020/21, at higher-than-market ‘penalty’ rates; purchase of government 
bonds in excess of THB 100 billion in March to ensure the normal functioning of the 
government bond market; a special facility was set up to provide liquidity for 
mutual funds through banks. 
• UK – BoE: Expanding the central bank’s holding of UK government bonds and non-
financial corporate bonds by £200 billion; HM Treasury and the BoE have agreed to 
extend temporarily the use of the government’s overdraft account at the BoE to 
provide a short-term source of additional liquidity to the government if needed. 
• US – Fed: Commercial Paper Funding Facility to facilitate the issuance of. 
commercial paper by companies and municipal issuers; Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility to provide financing to the Fed’s 24 primary dealers collateralised by a wide 
range of investment grade securities; Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
(MMLF) to provide loans to depository institutions to purchase assets from prime 
money market funds (covering highly rated asset backed commercial paper and 
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municipal debt); Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility to purchase new bonds 
and loans from companies; Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility to provide 
liquidity for outstanding corporate bonds; Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
to enable the issuance of asset-backed securities backed by student loans, auto 
loans, credit-card loans, loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration, and 
certain other assets; Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) to 
provide liquidity to financial institutions that originate loans under the Small Business 
Administration’s Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) which provides a direct 
incentive to small businesses to keep their workers on the payroll; Main Street 
Lending Program to purchase new or expanded loans to SMEs; and (ix) Municipal 
Liquidity Facility to purchase short-term notes directly from state and eligible local 
governments. 
(4) Direct credit 
allocation 
instruments 
• Australia – RBA: Establishing a term funding facility of at least A$90 billion for access 
to three-year funding at 25 basis points to allow banks to lend more to SMEs during 
the period of disruption caused by COVID-19. 
• Colombia – Superfinanciera: Banks cannot increase interest rates on loans, charge 
interest on interest, or report entities to credit registries for availing themselves of any 
forbearance measures. 
• Costa Rica – BCCR: Reducing the cost of credit, minimum two-month moratorium 
on the payment of principal and/or interest for personal credit, mortgages, auto 
loans, credit card loans, consumer loans, and education loans for affected 
households and firms. 
• Chile – Financial Markets Commission: Measures to facilitate the flow of credit to 
businesses and households, including special treatment in the establishment of 
provisions for deferred loans; use of mortgage guarantees to safeguard SME loans; 
adjustments in the treatment of assets received as payment and margins in 
derivative transactions. 
• Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo – 
BCEAO: special three-month refinancing window at a fixed rate of 2.5 per cent for 
limited amounts of three-month ‘Covid-19 T-Bills’ to be issued by each West African 
Economic and Monetary Union sovereign to help meet funding needs related to 
the current pandemic; measures to promote the use of electronic payments. 
• China – People’s Bank of China (PBOC): Expansion of re-lending and re-discounting 
facilities by RMB 1.8 trillion to support manufacturers of medical supplies and daily 
necessities, micro and SMEs and the agricultural sector at low interest rates; 
reduction of targeted medium-term lending facility rate by 30 and 20 bps; targeted 
reserve requirement ratio cuts by 50–100 bps for large- and medium-sized banks 
that meet inclusive financing criteria which benefit smaller firms; an additional 100 
bps for eligible joint-stock banks, and 100 bps for small- and medium-sized banks in 
April and May to support SMEs, policy banks’ credit extension to micro- and small 
enterprises (RMB 350 billion). 
• Cyprus – Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC): Encouraging banks to apply favourable 
interest rates for new loans and newly restructured loans. 
• France – Banque de France (BdF): Credit mediation to support renegotiation of 
SMEs’ bank loans. 
• Hong Kong SAR – HKMA: Introduction of low-interest loans for SMEs with 100 per cent 
government guarantee (HK$ 50 billion). 
• Hungary – MNB: New SME lending programme (FGS GO!) with increased amounts 
and increase in the interest rate subsidy, provision of a grace period of repayment 
of loans to the Growth Funding Facility (subsidised lending to SMEs supported by the 
MNB); extension of short-term loans to businesses, cap on the average annual 
percentage rate on new unsecured consumer credit at the central bank base rate 
(currently, 0.9 per cent) plus 5 per cent, intended to sterilise liquidity injected 
through both the FSG GO! and BFSG programmes through a preferential deposit 
facility bearing a 4 per cent interest rate. 
• Japan – BOJ: New fund-provisioning measure to support financing of mainly SMEs 
through the provision of funds against loans such as interest-free and unsecured 
loans made by eligible counterparties based on the government’s emergency 
economic measures. 
• Latvia – 50 per cent cut in interest rates on loans for SMEs in the tourism sector and a 
15 per cent cut for large enterprises. 
• Mexico – Banxico: New financing facilities for commercial and development banks 
(350 billion pesos) to allow them to channel resources to micro and SMEs and 
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individuals affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Credit will be provided in 
exchange for conventional repo collateral as well as banks’ corporate loans, which 
would free up liquidity in the banks’ balance sheets currently used especially by 
corporate credit lines for new credit extension. 
• Morocco – BAM: Suspension of loan payments for SMEs and self-employed people; 
increasing and lengthening of central bank refinancing operations to support 
banking credit to SMEs. 
• Russia – CBR: Introduction of RUB 500bn facility for SME lending; interest rate on CBR 
loans aimed at supporting lending to SMEs, including for urgent needs to support 
and maintain employment was reduced from 4.0 to 3.5 per cent. 
• Korea – BOK: Increasing the ceiling of the Bank Intermediated Lending Support 
Facility by a total of KRW 5 trillion (about 0.26 per cent of GDP) and lowering the 
interest rate to 0.25 per cent (from 0.5–0.75 per cent) to augment available funding 
for SMEs. 
• Thailand – BOT: Soft loans by BOT to financial institutions amounting to THB 500 billion 
for on-lending at 2 per cent interest to SMEs with outstanding loans not classed as 
non-performing loans (NPLs); the government covers the first six months of interest 
and guarantees up to 60–70 per cent of these loans. 
• UAE – CBUAE: 15–25 per cent reduction in provisioning for SME loans; limiting bank 
fees for SMEs.  
• UK – BoE: New Term Funding Scheme to reinforce the transmission of the rate cut, 
with additional incentives for lending to the real economy, and especially SMEs. 
2. Financial stability: Regulation and supervision 
(5) Microprudential 
instruments 
• Australia – Australian Prudential Regulation Authority: Temporary relief from capital 
requirement, allowing banks to utilise some of their current large buffers to facilitate 
ongoing lending to the economy as long as minimum capital requirements are met. 
• Chile – CBC: Expansion of eligible currencies for meeting reserve requirements in 
foreign currencies, flexibilization of Central Bank regulations for bank liquidity. 
• Denmark – Danish Financial Supervisory Authority: Case by case relaxation of 
regulation on the LCR requirement.  
• Eurozone – ECB/ESCB Banking Supervision: Flexibility in the classification 
requirements and expectations on loss provisioning for NPLs, temporary capital relief 
for market risk by adjusting the prudential floor to banks’ current minimum capital 
requirement. 
• Cambodia – NBC: Delaying additional increases in the Capital Conservation Buffer. 
• Cyprus – CBC: Release of capital and liquidity buffers for banks directly supervised 
by the CBC (€100 million), simplification of documentation requirements for new 
short-term loans and other credit facilities. 
• Hong Kong SAR – HKMA: Encouraging banks to deploy their liquidity buffers more 
flexibly, and easing interbank funding conditions by reducing the issuance size of 
Exchange Fund Bills, measures by banks to the extent permitted by their risk 
management principles, including delay of loan payment, extension of loan tenors, 
and principal moratoriums for affected SMEs, sectors, and households as 
appropriate. 
• Italy – Banca d’Italia: Allowing possibility to temporarily operate below selected 
capital and liquidity requirements; extension of some reporting obligations. 
• Japan – Financial Services Authority (FSA): Banks can assign zero risk weights to 
loans guaranteed with public guarantee schemes. 
• Malaysia – BNM: Temporary easing of regulatory and supervisory compliance on 
banks to help support loan deferment and restructuring. 
• Morocco – BAM: Banks are authorised to go below the 100 per cent LCR until end 
of June 2020; provisioning requirements are suspended for loans’ benefiting from a 
temporary payment moratorium until end of June 2020; capital conservation buffer 
is reduced by 50 bps for one year. 
• New Zealand – RBNZ: Reduced bank’s core funding ratio requirement to 50 per  
cent from 75 per cent; regulatory change requiring higher capital for banks has 
been postponed. 
• Norway – NB: Temporary easing of mortgage regulations, in particular increase in 
the percentage of mortgages that can deviate from the regulations. 
• Russia – CBR: Temporary regulatory easing for banks intended to help corporate 
borrowers. 
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• Singapore – Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS): adjusted selected regulatory 
requirements and supervisory programmes. 
• South Africa – SARB: Temporary relief on bank capital requirements and reduction in 
the LCR from 100 to 80 per cent to provide additional liquidity and counter financial 
system risks. 
• Spain – BOS: for banks it supervises, the BOS applies the flexibility provided by the 
legal system in relation to the setting of transition periods and the intermediate 
minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities targets. 
• Korea – BOK: Temporary easing of loan-to-deposit ratios for banks and other 
financial institutions and the domestic currency LCR for banks. 
• UAE – CBUAE: Allowing the use of banks’ excess capital buffers (AED 50 billion); 
increasing LVRs for first-time home buyers by 5 percentage points; raising the limit on 
banks’ exposure to the real estate sector from to 30 per cent of risk-weighted assets, 
subject to adequate provisioning. 
• UK – Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA): Pillar 2A requirements set as a nominal 
amount instead of a percentage of total Risk Weighted Assets; to mitigate the 
possibility of procyclical market risk capital requirements, firms are temporarily 
allowed to offset the increase in risk-weighted assets due to the automatic 
application of a higher Value-at-Risk (VaR) multiplier through a commensurate 
reduction in risks-not-in-VAR capital requirements. 
• US – Federal banking supervisors: Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities and deposits at 
the Federal Reserve Banks can be temporarily excluded from the calculation of the 
supplementary leverage ratio for holding companies; community bank leverage 
ratio lowered to 8 per cent; PPP covered loans will receive a 0 per cent risk weight; 
and assets acquired and subsequently pledged as collateral to the MMLF and 
PPPLF facilities will not lead to additional regulatory capital requirements. 
(6) Macroprudential 
instruments 
• Canada – Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions: Lowering the 
Domestic Stability Buffer for Domestic Systemically Important Banks. 
• Costa Rica – BCCR: Temporary reduction in the minimum accumulation of 
countercyclical provisions for financial entities to zero. 
• Denmark – DN: Release of the countercyclical capital buffer and cancellation of 
the planned increases meant to take effect later. 
• Eurozone – ECB/ESCB Banking Supervision: Allowing significant institutions to operate 
temporarily below the Pillar 2 Guidance, the capital conservation buffer, and the 
LCR; new rules on the composition of capital to meet Pillar 2 Requirement were 
front-loaded to release additional capital; appropriate release of the 
countercyclical capital buffer by the national macroprudential authorities will 
enhance its capital relief measures. 
• Cyprus – CBC: Additional capital release measure, with a 12-month extension of the 
phased-in introduction of Other Systemically Important Institutions capital buffer. 
• Estonia – Eesti Pank: Reducing the systemic risk buffer for the commercial banks 
from 1 to 0 per cent. 
• Finland – BOF: 1 ppt reduction in the structural buffer requirements of all credit 
institutions by removing the systemic risk buffer and adjusting institution-specific 
requirements. 
• France – BdF: Reducing the countercyclical bank capital buffer to 0 per cent. 
• Germany – Bundesbank: Release of the countercyclical capital buffer for banks 
from 0.25 to 0 per cent. 
• Belgium – National Bank of Belgium: Reducing the countercyclical bank capital 
buffer to 0 per cent. 
• Hong Kong SAR – HKMA: Reducing the countercyclical capital buffer from 2 to 1 
per cent. 
• Hungary – MNB: Reducing the Foreign Exchange Coverage Ratio; temporary 
elimination of additional capital buffer requirement for systemically-important 
banks. 
• Indonesia – BI: Adjusting macroprudential regulation to ease liquidity conditions and 
support bond market stability. 
• Ireland – Central Bank of Ireland: Release of the countercyclical capital buffer, 
which will be reduced from 1 to 0 per cent. 
• Japan – FSA: Banks can draw down their capital conservation and systemically 
important bank buffers to support credit supply, and draw down their stock of high-
quality liquid assets below the minimum LCR requirement. 
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• Lithuania – Band of Lithuania: Reducing the countercyclical capital buffer from 1 to 
0 per cent. 
• New Zealand – RBNZ: Removing mortgage LVR restrictions. 
• Norway – NB: Easing of countercyclical capital buffer by 1.5 percentage points; 
banks can temporarily breach the LCR. 
• Russia – CBR: Measures to ease liquidity regulations for systemically important credit 
institutions, cancellation of add-ons to risk weights for mortgage loans. 
• Portugal – Banco de Portugal: Relaxing some aspects of its macroprudential 
measures for consumer credit; series of measures directed to less significant banks 
under its supervision; possibility to temporarily operate below selected capital and 
liquidity requirements. 
• Spain – Adoption of a new macroprudential liquidity tool empowering the National 
Securities Market Commission to modify requirements applicable to management 
companies of Collective Investment Schemes. 
• Switzerland – SNB: Deactivation of the countercyclical capital buffers; Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority: temporary exclusion of deposits held at 
central banks from the calculation of banks’ leverage ratio. 
• Sweden – Riksbank: Easing of countercyclical capital buffer by 2.5 percentage 
points; possibility for banks to temporarily breach the LCR for individual currencies 
and for total currencies; suspension of amortisation requirement; extension of the 
phase-in period for banks to comply with the new minimum requirements for own 
funds and eligible liabilities. 
• Netherlands – DNB: Reducing systemic buffer requirements for the three largest 
banks to support bank lending; temporary regulatory relief to less significant 
banking institutions; planned introduction of a floor for mortgage loan risk weighting 
is postponed. 
• UK – BoE: Reducing the UK countercyclical buffer rate to 0 per cent from a pre-
existing path towards 2; PRA: non-publication of results of 2019 Insurance Stress Test 
2019 (including a climate change exploratory exercise) and postponement of next 
Insurance Stress Test until 2022; PRA and Financial Policy Committee: postponing the 
launch of the Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario exercise for large banks and 
insurers until at least mid-2021. 
3. Other policies 
(7) Further financing 
schemes and other 
initiatives 
• Singapore – MAS: Package of measures to help individuals and SMEs facing 
temporary cashflow difficulties. The package has three components: help 
individuals meet their loan and insurance commitments; support SMEs with 
continued access to bank credit and insurance cover; and  ensure interbank 
funding markets remain liquid and well-functioning. 
• UK – BoE: Launch of the joint HM Treasury–Bank of England Covid Corporate 
Financing Facility which, together with the Coronavirus Business Loans Interruption 
Scheme, makes £330bn of loans and guarantees available to businesses (15 per 
cent of GDP). 
(8) Management of 
central bank 
portfolios 
• No initiatives found. 
(9) Supporting 
sustainable finance 
(examples of 
measures newly 
implemented in  
the context of 
COVID-19) 
• Cambodia – NBC: Guidelines to financial institutions on loan restructuring for 
borrowers experiencing financial difficulties (but still performing) in priority sectors 
(tourism, garments, construction, transportation and logistics). 
• EU – ECB: Public consultation on guide on climate-related and environmental risks. 
• France – Autorité de Contôle Prudentiel et de Résolution/BdF: Report on 
‘Governance and management of climate-related risks by French banking 
institutions’. 
• Hong Kong SAR – HKMA: Creation of a Green and Sustainable Finance Cross-
Agency Steering Group. 
• Indonesia – BI: Initiatives to futher financial deepening, access to financial services, 
and monetary operations, including by facilitating collaboration between the 
banking industry and Fintech companies, and introducing Sharia-compliant 
instruments. 
• Mexico – Banxico: Creation of a Sustainable Finance Committee. 
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• Philippines – BSP: Sustainable Finance Framework to safeguard the financial system 
from the evolving material hazards from climate change and energy transition risk 
including stranded assets. 
• Singapore – MAS: S$125 million support package to sustain and strengthen financial 
services and Fintech capabilities (funded by the Financial Sector Development 
Fund, has three main pillars: supporting workforce training and manpower costs; 
strengthening digitalisation and operational resilience; and enhancing Fintech 
firms’ access to digital tools). 
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